Детерминанты остатка денежных средств российских компаний
Данная работа посвящена теме детерминантов остатка денежных средства российских компаний. Целью данного эмпирического исследования было определить детерминанты остатка денежных средств российских компаний. Для того чтобы выполнить основную цель исследования, следующие задачи были сформулированы и выполнены: определить основные теоретические модели мотивов хранения денежных средств и задач управления денежными средствами; проанализировать релевантную литературу и эмпирические исследования по теме управления денежными средствами; сформулировать гипотезы о взаимосвязи факторов и денежных средств на основании теории и эмпирики; сформировать выборку российских компаний и провести эконометрическое исследование; сформулировать практическое обоснование результатов и выводы на основании результатов. Было обнаружено, что российские компании, вероятно, имеют целевой остаток денежных средств. Также было выяснено, что рычаг, ликвидность и материальные активы оказывают значимое и отрицательное влияние на денежные средства. Другим результатом является то, что размер и возможности роста также оказывают значимое, но положительно влияние на денежные средства. Другим аспектом исследования является эффект государственного владения, который, как было доказано эмпирически, является значимым детерминантом денежных средств российских компаний.
Cash holdings management is a matter of critical meaning in the field of economic and financial functionating of an enterprise. How large cash balance to maintain and why exactly this much – are problems which almost every financial manager in a company faces. Business practitioners have different opinions on factors which determine the amount of money a firm keeps as cash balance. Except purely financial determinants of cash holdings, there are also corporate governance characteristics of each single company that affect hugely the way a company will maintain its cash balance. There is no joint opinion whether target cash holdings ratio exists, as a practical approximation of optimal cash holdings ratio.
In such a situation empirical researches should come up in order to support theoretical studies. The former is meant to reflect how significant in real business world certain factors, described theoretically, are. Factors’ impact on cash holdings are determined by different motives, which vary much across theoretical models. Practice shows that different motives are dominant in different country markets. It may be either precautionary motive, or transactional motive, or agency motive, or any other motive that is determined by specificity of institutes’ functionating in a given country. Sociocultural factors, level of development of institutional environment, cognitive, normative and regulatory structures – all these items may affect the way local managers will execute their financial practices, which include cash holdings management of an enterprise.
Many questions about Russian business environment require additional investigation. The question of cash holdings management is not an exception. It turns out that while making decisions about cash holdings Russian financial managers are able to rely only on general financial logic, their own professional experience or Western theoretical models, which are not always relevant to Russian context.
What is also important, the mentioned issues are not that much researched in Russia. It is likely, that this work is able to give practitioners a better and deeper understanding of how Russian enterprises execute cash holdings management and how to realize this process in the most efficient way.
Another important issue is that corporate governance phenomenon in cash holdings management is not a point of research in Russian business science. Russia has its unique corporate governance framework that distinguishes it among all other emerging economies. Investigation of corporate governance features’ impact on corporate cash holdings could be undertaken via both direct and indirect indicators. At this moment it becomes crucial to study the impact of corporate governance features that affect cash balance of Russian companies.
The presented empirical study has a goal of defining cash holdings determinants, including the corporate governance aspect of state-ownership, of Russian companies. In order to attain this goal, the following research objectives have been formulated.
• To determine the main theoretical models explaining motives and objectives of cash holdings management and to evaluate their application in Russian market context.
• To analyze relevant literature and empirical studies on the topic of corporate governance determinants of cash holdings and to assess Russian corporate governance framework.
• To formulate hypotheses about the nature of relationship between factors in the selected theories and cash holdings balance or Russian companies.
• To form a sample of tier one Russian companies and to check the hypotheses with the help of econometric modeling.
• To find a justification for the results obtained and to make inferences about.
At this stage of the research preceding to the empirical part it was assumed that the following correlation relationships between factors and cash holdings will be defined. Positive relationships between cash holdings ratio and growth opportunities, volume and volatility of cash flows, real size of firm, amount of intangible assets under control of an enterprise. Negative relationships between cash holdings ratio and research & development expenditures, financial leverage, net working capital, capital expenditures. Multivariate regression analysis, as the main method of research is meant to check these assumptions for consistency. Corporate governance features of Russian companies, namely state-ownership, are not obviously connected with cash holdings, so that their relationships with cash balance is hard to predict in advance and is to be determined during the empirical part.
This work consists of two chapters. In the first one the term of the research object, cash holdings of a company, cash management goals, main theoretical models revealing the essence of cash management motives as well as empirical results of other studies are examined. Corporate governance features of Russian business context are also depicted in the first chapter. The second chapter is devoted to the empirical part of the work. In this part the overall view of the regression model is determined, the main hypotheses of the research regarding the correlation relationships between cash holdings and the factors are formulated, the regression analysis itself is carried out, which results are presented in the end of this chapter. Possible practical recommendations and advice on the usage of the results obtained are presented in the very end of the main part of the work.
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