Торговая война США и Китая. Возможные последствия для России и мировой экономики
Целью данной магистерской диссертации является исследование эффекта торговой войны США и Китая на мировую экономику и на экономику России. Главный тезис работы состоит в том, что торговая война экономически невыгодна всем вовлеченным игрокам.
Хотя в литературе выделяются фундаментальные теории, которые объясняют предпосылки тарифных войн, торговая война между США и Китаем является качественно иным явлением. Данная работа стремится восполнить пробел в исследовании теоретических аспектов торговой войны, а также дать актуальную количественную оценку. Для понимания феномена торговых войн проведен теоретический анализ, основанный на экономической теории и теории международных отношений. Ретроспективный анализ торговой политики позволяет выявить мотивы США в отношениях с Китаем и проблемы экономической и геополитической конкуренции двух держав за лидерство. Количественная оценка последствий торговой войны основана на традиционной теории торговли. В работе анализируется динамика торговли тарифицируемыми продуктами до и после начала торговой войны с учетом последних тарифных траншей США и Китая. Влияние дополнительных тарифов США на ввоз китайских товаров, по сравнению с поставками по обычным ставкам, оценивается на основе метода линейной регрессии.
Хотя анализ показывает, что абсолютные экспортные потери Китая в тарифицируемых продуктах выше, чем в США, торговая война негативно сказалась на обеих экономиках. Торговая война привела к переориентации торговых потоков в пользу основных поставщиков США, в то время как рост импорта Китая замедлился, и эффект замещения американских товаров не был очевиден. Общий экономический эффект торговой войны на мировую экономику, сопряженный с возросшей неопределённостью, является отрицательным в силу снижения деловой активности, разрушения глобальных цепочек создания стоимости, ослабления роли международных институтов.
Непосредственное влияние торговой войны на российскую экономику обусловлено обязательствами США и Китая по «управляемой торговле» и возможным сокращением энергопотребления Китаем в результате замедления экономического роста. Косвенные издержки торговой войны ложатся на российских экспортеров стали и алюминия, которые могут столкнуться с более жесткой конкуренцией на азиатских рынках с китайскими поставщиками из-за введённых США дополнительных импортных пошлин. Китай заинтересован в импорте агропродовольственной продукции из России, но положительная тенденция экспорта сельскохозяйственных товаров может быть нарушена из-за обязательств Китая закупать больше этих продуктов из США. Среди «безопасных» категорий наращивания российского экспорта в Китай – химические вещества и металлы. России необходимо диверсифицировать свою структуру экспорта, учитывая незадействованный резерв спроса на рынках Азии. Кроме того, ввиду инвестиционных ограничений США в отношении Китая, расширяются перспективы российско-китайского сотрудничества в создании высокотехнологичной продукции.
Content …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 2
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 3
I Theoretical aspects of a trade war ………………………………………………………………. 12
1.1 Definition and reasons of trade wars…………………………………………………………….12
1.2 Methods of a trade war. Stages of a trade war escalation………………………………..24
1.3 Analysis of trade wars ……………………………………………………………………………….. 35 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 44 I
I The trade war between USA and China …………………………………………………….. 47
2.1 Why did the United States begin the trade war against China? ……………………….. 47
2.2. Scenarios of the trade war between Washington and Beijing and its impact on the global economy ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 66
2.3 The USA-China trade war: possible consequences for Russia……………………….100
III Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 109
Annex 1 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 112
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 121
More than seventy years of cooperation within the multilateral trading system bring the world to the threat of a global trade war triggered by tensions between the U.S. and China. The insight in all of international economics that there are mutual gains from free trade is argued by one of the most powerful economies in the world.1 The nature of the current challenges is complex due to the interweaving of economic, political, technological and cultural clashes. The U.S. approach to China recognizes long-term strategic competition and readiness to use its power to stop Bejing from reshaping the multilateral system to own advantage.
A trade war between countries does not bring positive effects for domestic economies in the long run and harms a multilateral trade system. Trade tensions between countries slow down economic growth and development of participating economies, inhibit international trade and undergo rules of fair trade environment. No one wins a trade war. The erosion of trade relations led to managed trade between the U.S. and China.
The U.S.–China trade talks started to draw increasingly the attention of scientists, policymakers, business circles, think tanks since the beginning of Trump’s Presidency. The phenomena of modern trade relations emerged when the two countries became engaged in a full-blown trade war. The trade war is not an unknown topic in the international trade literature but distinguishable characteristics of the U.S.–China trade war make it very special in terms of trade policy analysis at the modern stage.
The present paper includes theoretical observations of trade wars by J. Conybeare and Günter S. Heiduk and Kar-Yiu Wo.2’3 Conybeare distinguishes two patterns: trade war with asymmetrical payoff where weak state initiates the trade war,
1International Economics: Theory and Policy, 11th Edition. Paul R. Krugman, 2012. P.4 3
not realizing that stronger state will not only win, but also force a weaker to make commitments in its favor, and symmetrical trade war, where relatively strong powers confront each other engaging in harmful tit-for-tat attitude.2 According to the present classification, the USA-China trade war is the second type of pattern as the U.S. is deemed the Great Power through history and China is the Raising Power of the new century.
Günter S. Heiduk and Kar-Yiu Wo provide with analysis of the USA-EU «mini-trade war» highlighting that retaliatory measures even so allowed by Dispute Settlement Mechanism are not transparent, harmful for different sectors of the economy of a punished party, for third parties economic interests and with a negative incalculable impact.3 Authors bring us to the conclusion that the trade war is better not to start due to its exhausting effect on involved economies.
The different schools apply their theories to explain the nature of trade war (better to say in the provided context – tariffs war). Many economists (N. Kaldor, 1940; H. Johnson, 1953; C. Rodriguez, 1974; P. Krugman, 1991; B. Lockwood, K. Wong, 2000; C. Syropolous, 2001; K. Miyagiwa, H. Song, H. Vandenbussche, 2016) follow optimum tariff theorem, assuming that under certain conditions country may gain by imposing tariffs on its trade partner, even while facing retaliation. However, the present paper states that in practice governments do not have the detailed information to impose a precisely optimum tariff, therefore states use the terms of trade argument to justify its protectionism measures as necessary to rebalance trade.
During the period of domestic industrialization and up to the post-war period, countries (Britain, the U.S., EC, and Japan) were using protective measures to establish and then to expand their industries abroad and accumulate trade surplus – that was largely in the spirit of mercantilism. Some see (B. Milward, 2019) toady’s
2J. Conybeare.Trade wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts, p.148 3 Glinter S. Heiduk, Kar-Yiu Wong. WTO and World Trade Challenges in a New Era, 2005, p.281.
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protectionism as a consequence of populistic wave that has given a more inward- looking approach to international trade and move towards neo-mercantilism.
Several studies on international economics state that during the last two decades the U.S. has followed aggressive trade policy because of the weakening of its competitive position. Zeng Ka makes interesting observations that less dependent on American markets (EU, Japan) countries yield concession under the pressure of American coercive trade diplomacy more often than heavily dependent on export to the U.S. and having less bargaining power (China, Brazil, India). He also found out that the concept of democratic peace is not applicable to trade issues unlike military conflict; particularly it does not prevent democratic states from trade disputes with one another. The type of regime does not influence the probability of a trade war, but has an impact on the way to resolve trade conflicts. Depending upon the structure of bilateral trade states more or less likely to start a trade war.
Director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Elizabeth Economy reports that even though trade war has become possible under Trump, it indicates far more than President Trump’s desire to rebalance trade. The trade war is «the culmination of decades of pent-up frustration within the United States over China’s failure to make good on the promise of its 2001 accession to WTO: to open its markets, develop transparency and the rule of law within its trade regime, and protect intellectual property (IP)» (E. Economy, 2019). She concludes that trade war is the part of the broader geopolitical competition which invokes the decoupling of two major economies and confrontation of two models of development.
Political economists (C. Shaffer, 2003; R. Baldwin, 2006) see trade disputes as a result of the pressure of interest groups on the state. Gregory C. Shaffer explains the aggressive approach of the American trade strategy by the proactive role of its private business in litigations and studies the mechanism of public-private partnership. The author argues that the U.S. trade unilateralism is the result of «disproportional
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openness of the U.S. in comparison with foreign markets in the increasingly competitive globalizing economy».4
Historians and philosophers put the hypothesis of inter-civilization conflict, for example the Clash of Civilizations hypothesis (Huntington, S.P. 1998.). It states that in the post-Cold War period the dominating source of discord will be cultural, and dissimilarity in culture will lead to clashes over a range of issues including trade. G. Gokmen studies the hypothesis from an economic perspective and empirically proves that the negative influence of cultural differences on trade has increased over time.5
Finally, the application of political science and international relations approaches tells us that the U.S.-China trade war is politically driven conflict for the spheres of domination and global leadership. The trade war is a way to settle down opponents on the international scene and disturb its economic power.
The issue of competition for global leadership between the U.S. and China has become the subject of several studies before the trade war starts (James M. Dorsey, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, John G. Glenn, Pauken Ii Thomas Weir). The analysis of the U.S.-China geopolitical positions brings to the observation that the trade war is a tool to constrain China’s participation and ambitions in global governance. BDI (Federation of German Industries) policy paper «Partner and Systemic Competitor – How Do We Deal with China’s State-Controlled Economy?» outlines the long-term systemic challenges posed by China from the side of the EU.11
James M. Dorsey in his book «China and the Middle East» reports that China has significant economic and security interests in the greater Middle East particularly for the realization of ambitious project «One belt – One Road». The U.S. has strong motives to demonstrate to China its dominance over regions. 6 Ivo H. Daalder who has served as the United States Ambassador to the NATO in co-authorship with
4Gregory C. Shaffer. Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation. P.20, 2003.
5Gokmen G. Clash of civilizations and the impact of cultural differences on trade // J. Dev. Econ. 2017. Т. 127. No December 2015, p. 449–458.
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James M. Lindsay in the book «The empty throne» also raise the issue of American global leadership, which is under threat because of the effect of globalization that leads to the «rise of the rest», particularly the rise of China. Authors argue that the misguided foreign policy of the U.S allows China to fill the void of global leadership abandoned by Trump.7
There are different sorts of reasons from legal to personal factors that provoke the U.S. to start a trade war, but the main driver is the rise of China in the global arena. The U.S. has powerful arguments concerning China’s unfair trade practices but the tools chosen by Trump’s Administration to resolve trade tensions are not appropriate. The U.S. challenges the growing economic and technological potential of China via trade constrains. American Administration signals its readiness for long- term strategic competition with China. At the same time, the multilateral trading system is reaching its limits with the ongoing institutional crisis and the uncertainty of trade policies remains high. The trade war is a part of the broader imbalances resulted from hyperglobalization.
Though China’s absolute export losses in tariffed products are higher than the U.S., trade war negatively affected both economies, confirming the hypothesis of the lose-lose outcome of a trade war. As a result of the U.S. tariffs its imports from China of affected products decreased by 16% in 2019 in comparison with 2017. It is accounted for nearly 50 bln. U.S. dollars of China’s export losses or 10% of its total export to the U.S. or 2% of its global exports. As a result of China’s tariffs its import from the U.S. of affected products went down by 26% in 2019, it comprised nearly 34 bln. U.S. dollars export losses or about 22% of its total export to China or 2% of its global exports. The trade war disrupts supply chains making it less profitable to manufacture in China for selling to the U.S. because of higher tariffs. Investors who follow this business model including the U.S.’ MNCs should diversify their production facilities out of China.
In 2019 China managed to maintain 84% of its total export to the U.S. Most affected with the tariffs sectors of the Chinese economy are machinery and chemicals – reduction by 29%, manufactured miscellaneous (furniture, toys, garment) –
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reduction by 21%. In 2019 the USA maintained 80% of its total exports to China. Among the most affected with the trade war sectors of the American economy are mineral products – 60% reduction, vehicles – 16% reduction, machinery and electrical equipment– 15% reduction, base metals – 24,6% of reduction, agri-food exports – 6% of reduction. The U.S. imports of products from China subject to tariffs during the trade war declined by 32% in comparison with those not affected with additional tariffs. While China is the biggest consumer of LNG and crude oil, China is less dependent on imports of those products from the U.S.
Harm to the U.S. economy is passed through higher consumer prices and increased costs of intermediate inputs. China suffers from the trade war due to higher export orientation of economy and threat of relocation of foreign enterprisers to alternative locations. The trade war has a negative impact on world trade and investments. Despite the overall negative impacts of the trade war, third countries such as Mexico, Vietnam, Taiwan gained through increased exports of manufactured products to the U.S. as a result of the substitution of Chinese products. The effect of substitution of high-assembled American products in Chinese imports is less obvious. Argentina and Uruguay gained through increased exports of agricultural products to China (mainly soybeans). The Chinese import reduction from all major suppliers signals economic contraction that may lead to a downward spiral for the world economy.
The Economic and Trade Agreement between the U.S. and China signed at the beginning of 2020 indicates the de-escalation of the trade war, but structural reforms demanded by the U.S. are not coming in China. Under the Peace Deal China is committed to increasing imports from the U.S. by 200 bln. in two years. It indicates a shift towards managed trade. The agreement may redistribute trade in the favor of Washington in the energy, agricultural and manufacturing sectors and services. Non- American suppliers to China should manage the risks as the U.S. may crowd out their
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shares for products subjected to the Agreement. The legitimacy of trade expansion has to be litigated by third countries, but given the WTO crisis, there is a lack of enforceable legal mechanisms to preclude trade distortions. Moreover, the spillover effect of protectionism and high exposure of countries to external risks are leading to retreat from multilateralism.
Slowing down of the Chinese economy under pressure of the trade war will affect the energy sector of Russia through a decreasing demand and lower prices. The second channel is a reduction of Russian exports of energy once China pursues its commitment to purchase more form the U.S. Indirect costs of trade war pass to Russian steel and aluminum exporters that are likely to face tougher competition with Chinese suppliers in the Asian markets. China is interested in imports of agrifood from Russia, but a positive trend in agricultural trade may be disrupted with China’s commitments to buy more of those products from the U.S. Russia needs to diversify its export structure and integrate into regional value chains. Because of the U.S. investment restriction policy on business with China, there is a perspective niche in the high-tech sector.
1. John Conybeare. Trade wars: A Comparative Study of Anglo-Hanse, Franco-Italian, and Hawley-Smoot Conflicts, 1985. -P.148.
2. Glinter S. Heiduk, Kar-yiu Wong. WTO and World Trade Challenges in a New Era, 2005.-P.281.
3. Gregory C. Shaffer. Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO Litigation, 2003. – P.20,
4. Gokmen G. Clash of civilizations and the impact of cultural differences on trade // J. Dev. Econ. 2017. Т. 127. No December 2015. – P. 449–458.
5. James M. Dorsey. China and the Middle East. Venturing into the Maelstrom 2019. -P.278
6. Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay. The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership Hardcover, 2018. – P. 256.
7. John G. Glenn. China’s Challenge to US Supremacy. Economic Superpower versus Rising Star, 2016. – P.257.
8. Robert D. Blackwill. Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than They Seem. Council Special Report No. 84 April 2019. – P.112.
9. Krugman P. International Trade: theory and policy / Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, Marc J. Melitz. – 11th ed., global ed. – Harlow: Pearson, 2018. – P. 368. – ISBN 978-1-292-21635-5.
10. Carr, E. H. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939. // Harper Perennial: 450th ed. London, Macmillan, 1946. – P. 146
11. Zeng, Ka. Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, and American Coercive Diplomacy, University of Michigan Press, 2004. –P.324.
12. Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz. Going It Alone? Trade Policy After Three Years of Populism. The 25th Global Trade Alert Report, 2019. – P.173.
13. William Cline, Trade Policy and Global Poverty. //Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2004. – P. 180.
14. N. Kaldor. A Note on Tariffs and the Terms of Trade. Economica, n.s.7. November, 1940. –P. 377
15. Johnson, H. G. Optimum tariffs and retaliation. Review of Economic Studies. 1953.- P. 153.
16. Syropoulos, C. Optimum tariffs and retaliation revisited: How country size matters. Review of Economic Studies, 2002. P.-707-727.
17. Kreinin, M., Dinopoulos, E., & Syropoulos, C. (1996). Bilateral trade wars. International Trade Journal, 10. – P.3–20.
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