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Зависимость Европы от российской энергии
ЕС зависит от России как от основного поставщика, когда речь идет о нефти, газе и твердом топливе. Эта зависимость является важным фактором в энергетической политике ЕС. Несмотря на то, что в энергетических отношениях между ЕС и Россией существует взаимная зависимость, ЕС опасается сбоев в торговле энергией. Это отражается в политике ЕС, которая с 2009 года проводится на европейском уровне в дополнение к национальной политике. Основой энергетической политики ЕС является диверсификация источников энергии, уменьшение зависимости и стремление к коллективному европейскому подходу. Достижение последнего оказывается сложным, поскольку зависимость от российской энергии глубоко разделяет ЕС. Исходя из своих прошлых и экономических целей, государства-члены ЕС по-разному относятся к намерениям России. Тем не менее, события 2014 года, похоже, изменили общую европейскую перспективу, и с тех пор в ЕС стало больше единства. В конечном счете, безопасность энергоснабжения, а вместе с этим и будущее Европы, поставлено на карту.
Introduction 4
Theoretical remarks 9
Context 10
The emerge of a European Energy Policy out of Hampton Court 2005 10
The North Stream pipeline and German-Polish relations 17
The legal framework for EU- Russian energy relations 19
Dependence 22
The origin of European energy 22
Understanding dependence 27
Soviet legacy and Russia as main energy supplier of the EU 29
Increase or decrease? 30
Oil 30 Gas 32 Solid fuels 33 Explanation for increasing Russian dependence 35
Main energy trends
Russia
Conclusion
Literature and sources Appendix
Gas
Oil
Solid Fuels
in the EU society 37
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41 sector 43 domestic politics 44 foreign politics 48 50 53 61 65 65 66 67
European dependence on Russian energy is an important factor in the energy policies of the European Union (EU). Former Vice-President of the Energy Union, Maroš Šefčovič, referred to this during the meeting of the European Parliament’s Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee as “Energy plays a pivotal role in our relations with Russia, and Russia plays an important role in our energy policy. In fact, energy has been a cornerstone of our economic relations with Russia.”1
For nearly five decades, gas and oil trade and to a lesser extent solid fuel trade, have been a key feature of relations between (Soviet) Russia and several European states. In the 1960’s, the Soviet Union started to export large amounts of energy through pipeline systems. In the beginning, it was sent to European Comecon states (the economic organization under the leadership of the Soviet Union, better known as the “Eastern Bloc”), but later they shipped it to Western Europe as well, including members of the European Community and NATO. The strategic relevance of Russia as energy supplier increased during the global oil crisis in the 1970’s. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, East-West energy trade intensified as Russia inherited the role of Europe’s main energy supplier because most of the energy reserves and extraction facilities are located far away in Russia’s hinterland.2
Energy is closely related to geopolitics. In energy policy, geopolitical power is defined as the state’s capacity to gain control of national energy resources and transportation infrastructure, and to use or adjust them as a means to pursue foreign and security policy goals. This means that due to deployments of geopolitical power, economic motivations are subordinate to political goals.3 This is in particular the case for gas and oil trade. International conflicts have often disrupted international oil transactions. The first time this happened was in 1956, when European oil imports were hampered by the Suez crisis. The temporary closure of the Suez Canal was a result of the conflict between the United Kingdom (UK) and France on one side and Egypt on the other. When the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) boycotted the oil transport to Western countries in 1973, it was the second international oil crisis, but it became known as ‘the First Oil Crisis.’ A new crisis happened a couple of years
1 “Speech: The state of play of EU-Russia energy relations,” Europa Nu, published 25 March 2015, accessed 23 May 2020, https://www.europa- nu.nl/id/vjsjjrbvpiyy/nieuws/speech_the_state_of_play_of_eu_russia?ctx=via2fu30lxxr
2 Siddi, Marco, “The Role of Power in EU-Russia Energy Relations: The Interplay between Markets and Geopolitics,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 70 (2018): 1552-1571.
3 Idem.
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later in 1979 due to a power change in Iran. These crises led to price increases with negative economic consequences for oil importing countries. This resulted in a search for new oil fields in Europe and the United States (U.S), which proved later successful. Strategic oil stocks were set up to allow some months’ supply in case of new trade disruptions and the dependence on OPEC considerably decreased.4
By contrast, the gas market had been a regional matter for a long time. Gas pipelines are not build overnight and once the system lays down both consumer and supplier have a mutual interest in the proper functioning of these pipelines. Nevertheless, the history over the past 15 years has shown that political tensions are also rising in the gas trade, for example between Russia and Ukraine where the renewing of gas transportation contracts has led to disruptions in gas transit from Russia to Europe. The dispute between both states exposes Europe’s vulnerability concerning energy security as they feel the consequences of geopolitical situations elsewhere. Within the EU, gas trade has become a main source of controversy and it is one of the most politicised topics, despite its lesser economic role compared to European oil trade. The topic has deeply divided European member states. Fueled by a long history of Tsarist and Soviet domination, Eastern European states have a mistrust regarding Russia as main energy supplier, while Western European states have a more pragmatic look on the issue and see opportunities in EU-Russian cooperation. This does not alter the fact that since the start of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, fears about possible disruptions in the energy trade with Russia have increased, in particular with respect to gas trade as the transport through expensive pipeline systems creates a more vulnerable relation than the oil trade that is sold by barrels.5
Due to the closure of domestic coal and nuclear power stations, the demand for gas in the EU is expected to increase in the coming years. Extra import capacity is needed in order to meet this extra demand. This capacity increase is available in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals and expansion of pipeline capacity for Russian gas. The advantage of LNG over the traditional transportation of natural gas is the commercial opportunity because expensive pipeline systems are not necessary as LNG is transported overseas from locations where gas deposits are in excess. However, the relative high costs of production and the need to store it in special tanks have hindered the widespread commercial use so far. The future of the EU gas markets depends on a few pipeline projects. Currently under construction are the Turk Stream pipeline and North Stream 2. The Turk Stream pipeline will replace the previously
4 “Energy is and stays geopolitics,” Energie Podium, published 8 January 2020, accessed 21 May 2020, https://energiepodium.nl/artikel/energie-is-%C3%A9n-blijft-geopolitiek-gevoelig
5 Idem.
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planned Southstream pipeline allowing gas to be transported directly from Russia to Turkey. North Stream 2 allows gas transportation directly from Russia to Germany, bypassing several transit states. Both pipelines are controversial as they increase European dependence on Russian energy. Critics emphasize the strategic importance of energy exports for the geopolitical position of Russia.6
Typically, the EU is portrayed as a liberal actor in external energy policies, whereas Russia is seen predominantly as a geopolitical or realpolitik-driven player. This ignores the EU’s regulatory power, which is defined as the ability to formulate, monitor and enforce a set of market rules in a jurisdiction. The EU is the world’s largest integrated energy market and besides, it contains the European Commission which has a clear and strong enforcement capacity in amongst others the energy sector. In this respect, enforcement capacity is essential as foreign authorities will have to adapt to regulations. Enforcement tools backing up regulatory power may include penalties such as fines or exclusion from a market. Thanks to its regulatory institution and its enforcement powers, the EU arguably increased its ability to shape international market rules in line with its preferences.7
In her article “Is Russian Energy Policy towards the EU only about Geopolitics?” Tatiana Romanova claims that Russian energy policy is undeniably linked with geopolitics. She states that it becomes clear from strategic documents that energy is perceived for a strategic course. In Russian policy, security is giving privilege above the market and includes state interference, top-down problem solving and ad hoc solutions. Furthermore, she argues that in Russian policies, energy is used as a tool to boost internal development and maximize its presence in the global economy. Subsequently, she nuances her views by stating that is it too simplistic to only consider geopolitical motives. She concludes that Moscow indeed used legal and technocratic instruments that fit in the European market approach.8 Marco Siddi, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs and expert in EU-Russian energy relations partially agrees with her. He argues that EU-Russian energy relations are rather commercial than geopolitical because there have been commercial benefits for both sides. According to Siddi, the EU has proven to be more effective as a regulatory power than as a geopolitical power. The European Commission has been able to influence the planning of new infrastructural projects and even limited Gazprom’s monopolistic practices. This proves that
6 Shaffer, Brenda, Energy Politics (Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 116.
7 Siddi, Marco, “The Role of Power in EU-Russia Energy Relations: The Interplay between Markets and Geopolitics,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 70 (2018): 1552-1571.
8 Romanova, Tatiana, “Is Russian Energy Policy towards the EU only about Geopolitics? The Case of the Third Liberalisation Package,” Geopolitics 21:4 (2016): 857-879.
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currently regulatory power and market forces are the most influential drives of EU-Russia energy relations. He concludes that energy dependence between the superpowers works as interaction, as Russia is the most important energy supplier of the EU, the European market is vital for Russia’s energy revenues.9 Umut Turksen, author of the book “EU Energy Relations with Russia” has opposing views. According to him, the EU has endeavored to cooperate with Russia through bilateral and multilateral platforms, but that Russia continuously resisted these initiatives. Contrary to Romanova and Siddi, Turksen concludes that EU’s normative and intuitionalist approach is undermined by Russia’s state practices. He continues that there is no mutual dependence given the fact that the EU has not managed to diversify its energy sources and suppliers.10 The EU itself shares the same conclusions as Turksen. The European Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) conducted a study about energy as a tool of foreign policy. In their eponymous report, they conclude that Russia’s energy policies are shaped by geopolitical motives as well as commercial considerations. Although the policies do not solely serve Russia’s foreign policy objectives, Russia is able to exert political pressure through energy exports.11
Although the European dependence on Russian energy has been researched extensively, this thesis attempts to link long-term trends in combination with the current state of affairs. This link is relevant since this dependence is frequently discussed in European politics, but often in combination with current geopolitical relations. Here one responds to emotion without actually taking into account the long-term trends. Research into these trends can provide more insight into the relationship between the EU and Russia with regard to energy. From a European perspective, it is therefore particularly useful to understand the extent to which the EU is really dependent and what possible alternatives exist. That the topic is relevant is evident from the numerous debates in the European Parliament about the European diversification strategies with regard to EU energy imports.12 In addition, there is a debate in both the academic world and on the European political scene in which is argued, on the one hand, that Russian energy policy is actively pursuing influence. They associate Russia’s energy policies with state control and
9 Siddi, Marco, “The Role of Power in EU-Russia Energy Relations: The Interplay between Markets and Geopolitics,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 70 (2018): 1552-1571.
10 Turksen, Umut, EU energy relations with Russia: solidarity and the rule of law (London: Routledge, 2018), 75.
11 “Energy as a tool of foreign policy of authoritarian states, in particular Russia, April 2018, accessed 9 May 2020, AFET committee European Parliament, 35.
12 Debate: “State of EU-Russia political relations,” European Parliament Strasbourg 11 March 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-8-2019-03-11-ITM-023_EN.html
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geopolitical ambitions. On the other side of the debate, scholars are convinced that it is a question of mutual dependence in which the EU has as much power, if not more, than Russia. Based on the above, the following research question has been formulated: How is the European dependence on Russian energy characterized and how is this reflected in European energy policy?
The timeframe of this thesis is between 2005 and 2017. Twelve years seems to be a relatively short period of time to investigate long-term trends, but it offers a sufficient scope to study them. In addition, the EU expanded in 2004 with no fewer than ten new member states. Eight of these member states were part of the former Warsaw Pact and with their arrival in the EU, the energy landscape changed drastically. Moreover, in 2005 for the first time, real concrete steps were taken to formulate a common European energy policy.13 Finally, all relevant data related to European energy imports is only up to 2017 and newer date is unfortunately not yet publicly available.
For this research, data, primary sources and secondary literature will be used. The data comes from Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU. The main primary sources are policy documents and scientific reports. The documents provide a detailed insight into the positions adopted by the EU with regard to Russian energy imports. Also (translated) Russian policy documents shall be used to gain insight into the Russian energy market. This thesis is analytical in nature, whereby sources and literature are examined critically. The use of news reports is limited as much as possible to keep the information as objective as possible. Nevertheless, for any text that will be used, it is important to keep in mind the author’s perspective or potential agenda as it may affect what they write. Although efforts have been made to write this thesis as objective as possible, it is undeniable that it is written from a European perspective, given the number of sources from the EU.
In order to provide adequate answers to the research question, sub questions will be used. Firstly, the context of the European-Russian energy relationship will be discussed, focusing on the realization of the current energy policies and the legal framework. The North Stream pipeline will also be briefly discussed as a case study. The sub questions that belong to this chapter are: What is the context of EU-Russian energy relations? What is the legal framework of the EU-Russian energy relationship? The second chapter then discusses the European dependence on energy imports itself. In this chapter it becomes clear where the energy per European member state comes from and what the influence of Soviet legacy has on
13 Green Paper: A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy,” 8 March 2006, accessed 1 December 2019, Commission of the European Communities, 14.
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this. The sub questions for this chapter are: Where does European energy originate from? What does dependence mean? How does Soviet legacy influence the current EU-Russian energy relationship? In the third chapter, European energy imports will be discussed in more detail, but only imports from Russia will be considered. In addition, efforts will also be made to explain the developments and attention will be paid to the current energy trends in the EU. The sub questions for this chapter are: What is the development of oil/gas/solid fuel imports from Russia of the EU between 2005 and 2017? How can this development be explained? What are the main energy trends in the EU society? This chapter will determine exactly how much energy of every sector (oil, gas and solid fuels) is imported from Russia per each member state and what its value is for the total European imports. Eventually, this entire overview can be found in the appendix. The last chapter turns away from the EU and zooms in on the Russian energy sector. The following sub questions will be addressed: How is the Russian energy sector organized? How does the Russian energy sector relate to Russia’s domestic politics? How does the Russian energy sector relate to Russia’s foreign politics? The emphasis in this chapter will lay on the interaction between the Russian energy sector and Russian domestic and foreign policies. Finally, in the conclusion the main findings will be summarized and an answer to the research question will be provided.
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